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Introduction: Automated Vehicle Markets Follow Two Paths1
As described by Grush and Niles in their textbook, The End of Driving: Transportation Systems and 
Public Policy Planning for Autonomous Vehicles,2 there are two distinct market states for the future 
of automobility as vehicles become increasingly automated. The first, Market-1, is comprised of all 
vehicles that are manufactured and sold to private owners and used as household vehicles. This 
private consumer fleet will—through automated driver assistance systems (ADAS)—be increasingly 
capable of hands-off operation, even self-driving in certain environments such as limited-access 
expressways. The second category, Market-2, represents all the vehicles made expressly for the 
service market, i.e., roboshuttles and robotaxis, meant to be eventually driverless in prepared, 
defined areas and streets. Ford, GM, Lyft, Uber, Waymo, and dozens of other companies assert 
that they are preparing vehicles for Market-2.3
Clearly, there have been markets for purchasing private vehicles and for renting service vehicles 
since the automobile was invented. Indeed, the advent of ride-hailing companies that depend 
on their drivers’ personal vehicles means that some vehicles operate in both markets: they were 
purchased for use in Market-1 and were then deployed in Market-2 when the driver went on duty 
with a ride-hailing firm. The dichotomous market model explained here describes the use to which 
a vehicle is applied. 
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Automated For-Hire Vehicle (FHV) in a Waymo Fleet Offering Rides in a Pioneering Deployment in Chandler, Arizona
Source: Waymo.
As vehicle automation evolves, Market-1 participation will largely be a continuation of household 
ownership, which has been underway since the invention of cars. Market-2 taxicabs and transit 
have also been around since the horse and buggy, but now something new is happening: increasing 
competition between Market-2 and the buses and trains of public transit.4 In the S-1 filing for 
its IPO5, Uber clearly described its market view, explaining that finding ways to integrate and 
collaborate with public transportation is important, but that selling rides also clearly represents 
a market in which the private sector can compete with public transit. While Lyft, in its S-1 filing,6 
described only integration with public transit, Lyft does in fact compete with bus service in response 
to business opportunity by offering on-demand rides along public transit corridors.
In seeking ways to satisfy their preferences, travelers will typically prefer not to make compromises or 
transgress their personal limits when it comes to door-to-door trip time, financial cost, and personal 
comfort. If these predilections are not able to be regularly satisfied by Market-2 ride services, then 
most travelers who can afford to do so will elect to take advantage of Market-1 because of personal 
travel expectations habituated over a century of expanding vehicle ownership. Private household 
vehicles, automated and increasingly affordable, will provide highly-competitive satisfaction as 
the best mobility option for many consumers unless Market-2 commercial ride services become 
routinely and consistently comfortable, affordable, fast, and instantly available.
Market-2 vehicles can be operated on a fixed-route schedule or according to an on-demand, where-
requested fashion, exemplified now by transportation network companies (TNCs), and by robotaxis 
in the future. Ride services operating in a fixed-route transit fashion can be, for instance, regularly-
scheduled buses and shuttles of various sizes. In either scheduled or on-demand modes, they 
can move in jitney-like fashion within delineated neighborhoods or as first-/last-mile on-demand 
shuttles systems connecting to trunk lines. 
No reliable forecast is possible for the level of vehicle ownership in 2070 or even 2030, or for the 
corresponding mix of Market-1 and Market-2 vehicles. Some Market-2 vehicles may continue to be 
government-operated like the public transit buses of today, and other Market-2 offerings may be 
operated within commercially-managed robotic fleets. For the foreseeable future, there will always 
be a portion of privately-owned Market-1 vehicles on the road. This claim stems from considering 
the realistic requirements some travelers have for carrying special personal appliances, work tools 
and loads, children in car seats, or other preferences for personal comfort or privacy that will be 
difficult to satisfy with standardized Market-2 fleet vehicles needing to serve many ride buyers in 
rapid succession. The desired goal, given the multiplicity of consumer requirements, is a governance 
system that is flexible enough to permit varying levels of ownership even if public policy were 
attempting to move certain zones of a city toward a higher ratio of Market-2 to Market-1 participants.
The main thesis in this essay is that a productive, efficient system of on-demand Market-2 mobility 
can evolve from incentive-based governance—here termed “harmonization management.” This 
approach strikes a contrast with rigid regulation of a style seen with big city taxicabs and based 
on using constrained service classifications or per-vehicle medallion approaches. This essay 
recommends that transportation authorities set up systems of robust pricing signals—incentives and 
fees—delivered through a universal, mandatory system providing efficient, equitable distribution of 
these signals. 
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Even though a growing ratio of Market-2 to Market-1 vehicles is considered by many urban 
transportation experts as desirable,7 this outcome is not guaranteed, nor has it been determined 
yet how such an outcome might be promoted in transportation governance to achieve a high level 
of optimization for travel time, energy consumption, and fleet size. Multiple fleets of public service 
vehicles will create complexity in ongoing work to improve urban livability related to land-use 
patterns, congestion, and walkability. Furthermore, how will a progressive urban society ensure 
social equity with respect to mobility affordability, availability, and accessibility for lower-income or 
disabled travelers?
In making the distinction between Market-1 and Market-2, the assumption is made that both 
markets will be supplied by private companies. Vendors in Market-1 will sell cars, as now, and 
private companies operating taxis, shuttles, and jitneys will make up Market-2. When ubiquitously 
available and inexpensive, commercial Market-2 vehicles will serve up a significant competitive 
challenge to public transit agencies. 
Without something like harmonization management operating as a force in the public interest, 
competing small-vehicle mobility services may cause a decline in demand for bus transit ridership 
on low-volume routes. This competition is highly likely to lead to more road congestion due to 
low-cost service redundancies from multiple fleets, along with the potential for poor coordination 
among these fleets and existing high-capacity transit modes such as urban rail, bus rapid transit, 
and commuter express buses.
If this threat can be expected as a laissez-faire outcome, then how might thinking around the 
meaning of “public transit” be reorganized to fend off this threat and to leverage the expected 
technological developments toward enhancing public transit? A harmonization management 
approach is detailed in the remainder of this essay to address this challenge.
Anticipating 2030–2050
Despite the potential of a relative downturn in personal Market-1 consumption in the decades 
ahead, North American households in aggregate will likely use motorized conveyances at least as 
much as they do now and for largely the same spectrum of purposes.8 Urban regional populations 
will continue to grow.9 Entrepreneurs, as always, will continue to create place-based experiences 
that masses of people will want to see, hear, and taste in person, and humans tend to consume 
more of whatever remains sufficiently convenient and economically accessible. In other words, 
there will be no overall drawdown in absolute demand for automobility in spite of a potential drop 
in ownership among some cohorts.
Users will continue to make travel choices based on personal preferences and budgets. If car 
operating costs and ride-hailing fares both drop as convenience in using cars rises, travel per 
capita is expected to increase, constrained obviously by physical limits on the amount of any 
person’s activity within the 24 hour day. Estimated quantitative levels for the likely increase in 
personal travel are unreliable, as they are based on imperfectly-related historical evidence and a 
modest understanding of how currently stated preferences predict future revealed preferences. 
Concomitantly, average trip frequency and distance can also be expected to increase, although the 
same provisos on limited evidence and understanding of preferences apply.
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One can expect, albeit with some uncertainty, that the high-capacity rail systems of today will 
continue for decades to come, although they may be upgraded, automated, expanded, and 
operated with shorter headways. Overall, a highly recognizable urban world in the 2050s is likely 
to emerge with two notable changes: (a) many road vehicles will not have human drivers, and (b) 
individuals and families will begin to own or lease fewer private motorized vehicles per capita for 
travel on public roads because of new readily-available ride services made possible by automation 
and easy digital ride-hailing.
The assumption that congestion will decline even as a regional population grows and car ownership 
wanes remains difficult to defend, since the relative numbers of travelers migrating from Market-1 
to Market-2 consumption are not yet quantified. Even worse, many optimistic assumptions include 
without justification the unreliable assumption that a high level of multi-passenger ridesharing will 
prevail rather than simple taxi-like solo traveler use of ride services.
We turn next to sketching out a means to deliver incentives that would influence personal travel 
behavior to reflect public policy goals.
What Might Be Achieved with Automated Vehicle Fleets?
The mobility governance problem is framed as follows: How can local governments most effectively 
unleash the promised benefits of automation, maximize accessibility, preserve or enhance social 
equity, and reduce (or at least not increase) congestion and environmental harms—all while 
understanding and respecting the motivation of for-profit operators who have come on the scene 
and are catalyzing innovation. If the goal for sustainability is to encourage urban travelers to buy 
rides instead of cars, urban leaders need to consider the sort of governance moves that need to 
be implemented in response to competing Market-2 fleets now under development by several well-
capitalized companies. Managements of these firms have automation toward driverless operation 
in view, described in the IPO descriptions of Uber and Lyft.
Incentives reflecting public policy need to be considered. Commercial fleet operators in a completely 
laissez-faire market will act to maximize their shareholder’s business interests—whether long-run 
or short-run—seeking sales, market share growth, and profit. Profit-seeking private providers may 
tend to emphasize ridership volumes over equitable geographic coverage and universal access, 
but government incentives as a form of intervention in the private business model could be aimed 
toward balancing ridership volume with equitable access for all sub-regions and socioeconomic 
groups, a balance explained thoroughly by Walker in Human Transit.10 Against this background, 
facilitating integration of ride-hailing fleets with access to fixed-route public transit nodes via 
subsidized service provided to citizens judged unable to bear the full cost of service would maintain 
and expand social equity.
Merely achieving reduced household ownership of passenger vehicles is inadequate for the quality 
of urban mobility sought by those observers and advocates who would like to see a vast majority 
of trips in shared autonomous vehicles and high-capacity transit. Instead, urban leaders in the 
United States and Canada should find ways to deploy Market-2 vehicles in an intelligent, high-
quality manner that encompasses all three dimensions of sustainability: economics, environment, 
and equity. 
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The argument here assumes Market-2 automated fleets—when they are eventually deployed—will 
be largely owned and operated by multiple competing private operators, each trying to optimize 
their fleet configuration, energy consumption, and network coverage while focused on cost and 
profit. To capture market share in a competitive environment, the operation of economics and 
the pursuit of customers will lead for-hire vehicles (FHVs) to configure an array of service levels, 
service frequencies, service areas, prices, and business strategies. 
While Cohen and Cavoli discuss government provision of automated vehicle ride services,11 most 
governments in USA and Canada are severely limited by both budget and mandate in offering 
multiple levels of quality, convenience, privacy, and personalization in services. Such variety is 
needed to persuade middle-to-higher-income travelers to abandon personal vehicle ownership 
while still addressing core social equity issues. “Social equity” here refers to relative access to 
jobs, shopping, social events, and all other basic activities of life within a reasonable time and 
cost, and regardless of age, economic circumstances, personal physical abilities, race, or gender. 
One goal of a Market-2 harmonization management system would be to secure more socially-
equitable attention on the elements that profit-seeking enterprises in this regime would not place 
as a primary focus.
Harmonizing Competitive Fleets of Automated Common Carriers
Without a new governance model for personal surface transportation and transit to match the 
approaching capabilities and features of digitalized mobility, growing numbers of automated road 
vehicles are likely to increase congestion and motivate residential sprawl as vehicle automation 
diffuses. In other words, without suitable governance, automated vehicles are unlikely to achieve 
these widely-sought benefits of the “new mobility”: a diminishing environmental impact, less 
land devoted to parking spaces, improved social equity, expanded access, increased trip 
availability for all, less over-burdened infrastructure, and better urban livability.
If regional transportation authorities do not develop tools to manage urban mobility, private and 
commercial fleets of automated vehicles would be more likely to compete in a dysfunctional 
manner—cherry-picking preferred users, for example—while slowing and complicating the 
movement of people and goods, including cyclists and pedestrians. Private fleets would compete 
for both participants and space,12 in the same way that goods delivery, transit, cyclists, and private 
vehicles compete today for road space just as they have done for over a century.
Clearly, there is value in a competitive market for mobility. However, if every vehicle or fleet operator 
plans to use its vehicles to optimize a private or commercial outcome on inevitably limited road 
space, curb space, and parking capacity, urban surface transportation systems will increasingly 
operate in a hyper-competitive style, to our economic and environmental detriment—as TNCs 
have begun to show in the congestion they generate.13,14
Vehicle automation facilitates enhanced mobility, but a systems approach is needed. Mobility is a 
market that needs some rules that fit with an intelligent, nuanced approach now made feasible by 
ride-hailed and driverless vehicles with digital governance. A good transportation network requires 
operational governance, making sure vehicles are safe and well-maintained, and easily hailed 
by apps or by showing up on schedule. At the same time, cities and regions require managed 
competition in the use of their transportation infrastructure, to make sure legislatively and legally 
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authorized social purposes and goals are achieved through market offerings. In the next section, 
the reader will find a sketch of how to achieve these characteristics, both now and when automated 
robotaxis are in service.
Performance Metrics
If governance of future Market-2 robofleets were to incorporate just four key performance 
components, then the private sector could be nudged toward several valuable transformations. With 
suitable calibration and measurement, the performance metrics proposed below would address 
many livability and environmental externalities addressable by FHV (for-hire vehicle) fleet operators 
even as they are seeking to grow market share profitably. These environmental outcomes include 
congestion abatement, efficient vehicle routing, customer satisfaction, higher vehicle occupancy, 
parking reduction, and regional connectivity. The four performance-based criteria are:
• Maximize vehicle occupancy: maximize the ratio of personal miles traveled to vehicle
miles traveled; that is, work to grow the PMT-to-VMT ratio.  Six passengers in two taxis
occupy less road space than six people riding in three, four, five, or six taxicabs.
• Lower the share of private vehicles in the aggregate public and private fleet: maximize
the ratio of miles of travel in shared, ride-selling Market-2 passenger vehicles to Market-1
vehicles. This criterion assumes that deadheading by Market-2 vehicles carrying no
passengers can be minimized with high-technology dispatching.
• Safeguard social equity: maximize accessibility, affordability, and spatial reach for all
customers willing to buy rides, with policies and tools to provide subsidies for specific destination
categories to targeted demographic groups like seniors, youth, low-income, and disabled.
• Leverage existing transit: maximize connectivity to high-capacity transit trunk lines, such
as rail and express bus lines, to take advantage of existing capacity that can provide efficient
mobility if well used.
These four performance metrics can be implemented within digital fleet-management architecture 
to replace the regulation of supply now typically provided by taxi medallion systems, TNC bans (as 
in British Columbia through mid-2019) or TNC caps (as in New York City). The goal is to ensure a 
fleet size that provides requisite public access to mobility while preventing the excessive capacity 
that generates road congestion and degrades the efficiency of overall human mobility. 
There are, of course, many other concerns: for example, safety, security, privacy, and road and 
parking pricing. These issues, which must be addressed, would also apply to automated Market-1 
vehicles owned and used by consumers, not just Market-2 ride services—but these issues are not 
covered in this essay.
Each of the four metrics above could be incentivized and measured through a combination of targeted 
performance-based subsidies. Using available data cloud and hand-held device applications, a 
digital method could be devised that supports traveler desires specific to a region and for specific 
user submarkets. Such a method must be flexible enough to comply with changing regional needs 
and to support technological innovation.
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A Policy Management Platform for Ride-Hailing Fleets
The End of Driving textbook15 proposes a real-time, cloud-based platform that encompasses the 
requirements outlined so far. It is termed a harmonization management system, abbreviated HMS, 
and it would provide any urban region or subset of its jurisdictions with the capacity to manage 
performance-calibrated subsidies that create, enhance, and extend community transit services by 
forming goal-specific collaborations with FHV providers. This approach amounts to changing and 
expanding the definition of public transit.
To broaden fixed-route public transit service coverage, reach, and effectiveness, HMS is envisioned 
to manage multiple, aggregated schedules of subsidies and incentives sourced from transit budgets 
and road-user fees, and potentially from commercial, 
retail, employer, and other sources who would have 
to be authorized to participate via HMS in shaping 
transportation and parking.
HMS is an actionable means to nudge a regional 
set of FHV providers, whether today or tomorrow, 
at any level of automation, “to fill gaps in the public 
transit network, right-size vehicles, and replace 
underperforming public transit routes... [and to] also 
expand the reach of public transport to a wider range 
of geographic territories, such as suburbs and rural 
areas.”16 The remainder of this essay provides detail 
on the operation and potential of an HMS beyond what 
is covered in The End of Driving textbook.
HMS could be designed to operate in a revenue-
neutral manner instead of consuming public funding. 
A transportation authority could nudge up vehicle 
occupancy, reduce parking demand, and motivate 
high service levels for the mobility-disadvantaged 
with trip-by-trip incentives paid for with road-use fees 
dedicated to achieving these and other policy-focused 
performance outcomes in ride services.  HMS could 
be a tool supporting the measurement and audit of 
trip-based road use fees assessed to ensure a sufficient subsidy source for incentives. The 
system design could be set to let a ride service operator avoid fees by earning an offsetting 
performance subsidy.
HMS turnkey elements not detailed in the textbook could include: 
• Support for delivering subsidy amounts that yield lower customer fares for particular
trip origins, destinations, and times of day. HMS would store all origin and destination
information for subsidies and road use fees. Specification of targeted locations would be
maintained in geographic information system (GIS) polygon shape files for transit stops
and stations, ridership catchment areas for first-/last-mile trips, transit deserts, drop-off
Figure 1: This regional map of the San Francisco–Oakland–
San José area shows numerous local governments 
potentially comprising a single, human- driven or driverless 
ride-hailing management region with variable performance 
subsidies and road-use fees per local jurisdiction. 
Map source: Wikipedia
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and pickup sites for retail and employment locations, and other policy-driven targets. This 
database would also store subsidy accounting information such as financial amounts, times 
of day when the subsidies are available, and limits.
• Trip finder. HMS accepts the origin and destination for a desired trip, reports available trip
subsidies to the ride customer, and then connects the ride-seeking user to a selected ride
provider. It is at this gateway that trip data are captured. HMS would not assign rides, drivers,
or routes; nor does it handle payment. It supplements systems offering mobility as a service
(MaaS) to travelers and would be integrated with available trip-finder smartphone apps.
• Accounting. HMS would confirm trips, allocate and distribute subsidies and any road-use
fees, prepare invoices, and keep audit information on behalf of the supervising authority
running the system.
HMS would operate in a way similar to how the dedicated Lyft app subsidizes rides to selected 
transit hubs of Pierce Transit in a pilot project funded by Federal Transit Administration in the 
Tacoma region of Washington State,17 but with six added advantages:
• HMS is meant to be agnostic regarding ride-providers. HMS helps a region and its
cities collaborate with multiple competing TNCs and taxi operators through a single gateway.
HMS would enable the definition of those collaborations, and then handle communication,
distribution, and reconciliation of subsidies, while the region and its municipalities and
citizens receive maximum mobility benefits. This approach creates an open, government-
supervised, fully commercial market for mobility.
• HMS would enable full data capture. Optionally, all trips gated through HMS—regardless
of subsidy eligibility—would include anonymized data capture indicating origin, destination,
and time. Occupancy, vehicle type (green subsidies and occupancy ratios), wait time, and
independent customer feedback are options.
• HMS would enable cost-neutrality by metering road use fees. This option would require
that all ride-hail trips are brokered through HMS as a government-supervised platform so
that all trips could be assessed for road-use fees that are made to vary based on distance,
time, and/or place. Only TNCs and taxi fleets that register on HMS would be eligible for
trip subsidies.
• HMS enables a focus on the mobility-disadvantaged. By setting different subsidies for
areas or times of limited transit availability, HMS could be tailored to support seniors who no
longer have driver’s licenses or for riders with disabilities. As is the case today, a variety of
ride-hail providers would offer different accessibility options, for example, vehicles capable
of loading passengers in wheel chairs. A base level of required alternatives for specified
disabilities could still be government-mandated for fleet operators, and with ride-by-ride
incentives provided to support economic sustainability for the private sector fleet operators.
Also, the geographic and time-of-day targeting capabilities of HMS could be integrated with
special subsidized lower fares authorized and provided to particular demographic groups
such as youth, seniors, and disabled holding appropriate identification.
M I N E T A  T R A N S P O R T A T I O N  I N S T I T U T E
Project 1903    August 2019
8
• HMS enables regional coordination while enabling different jurisdictional priorities.
Each municipality within a region could set its own subsidy and road use fee schedule. HMS
aggregates these data into a single subsidy per trip, even when a trip crosses jurisdictional
boundaries. Hence, the service side of a trip would know no transit boundaries, but its fees and
subsidies are audited, re-aggregated, and paid separately on a municipal basis. See Figure 1.
• HMS attracts additional and alternative transit funding by giving a region and its cities
the ability to collaborate with private stakeholders (retail, employers, sports, entertainment,
and others) to enhance and extend transit services to particular destinations with subsidy
payments from private resources.
Thus, HMS would manage multiple schedules of subsidies and incentives set by any number of 
municipalities and potentially with commercial interests within a region. See Figure 2.
Each combination of location, time, and subsidy grant amounts to a rule. For instance, “getting 
dropped off at the Hillsdale train station between 10:00 and 15:30, M–F, subsidized at $4.00” is 
a single rule. Meanwhile, “getting picked up at the Hillsdale station between 08:00 and 23:30 on 
Saturday is subsidized at $2.50” is a second rule. HMS would handle any number of rules. Rules 
include locations (represented by shape files in a geographic information system), times, days of 
the week, and monetary amounts. Exceptions, such as holidays, would require additional rules. 
HMS’s rule-based system is designed to support a public policy focus on performance metrics that 
matter for congestion, ridership, and social equity. For example, HMS can manage subsidy increments 
for higher vehicle occupancy or for electric vehicle use. HMS is especially pertinent for trip integration 
with transit and service provision to the mobility-disadvantaged, such as seniors with no car access. 
The user experience would be simpler than this description indicates. The user simply sees on 
a smartphone app, or hears on any telephone, a list of ride services, with a fare that is the net of 
any subsidies, each one satisfying her request; she picks the one preferred. HMS would handle 
everything else via data flows and invoice exchanges with the selected ride provider and with the 
appropriate regional, municipal, or commercial subsidizer. 
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Figure 2: HMS Roles Overview
Source: Grush Niles Strategic.
Conclusion
When you called for a taxi in the pre-Uber world, there was almost always a competitor’s taxi 
closer to you, but there was no way for you to know that. The smartphone apps from Uber and Lyft 
bridge that information barrier if you check them both before ordering a ride. Mobility-as-a-service 
apps are poised to expand service quality even further by presenting good options from many 
available modes and suppliers and letting the customer choose the best option. Massive, governed 
robofleets can contribute to this optimization in the future.
The current world of drivers alone in private vehicles fending for themselves—the core of today’s 
surface transportation reality—implies urban transportation systems of incomprehensible non-
optimality mixed with struggling transit systems. Mobility door-to-door is the world’s largest market, 
but the potential is mostly wasted in execution. According to Adam Jonas, a sophisticated market 
observer from Morgan Stanley, this is
“… a century-old ecosystem being ogled by outside players hungry for a slice of a $10-trillion 
mobility market. Many want in. It’s just beginning. And it won’t stop.”18
A new governance system like HMS for publicly available conveyances is needed as this optimized, 
commercial transit technology continues pushing existing mobility systems aside, illustrated in the 
case of Uber and Lyft arriving in U.S. cities and taking market share from public transit.19
A safer roadway is reasonable to expect as vehicle automation diffuses and collisions become 
less frequent, but there is no guarantee of a more efficient or less congested roadway unless 
competitive behaviors are channeled and harmonized. Demand on congested road and curb space 
will increase as urbanization continues and automation makes cheap and personal motor travel 
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available to more people and for longer distances, unless a shift to shared vehicles and shared 
rides is both effective and dramatic.20
Digitalization enables automation and connectivity for vehicles as well as mobility-as-a-service 
and transit apps for trip management and digital managers for fleet optimization. Furthermore, 
digitalization can be expanded to harmonize fleet traffic in order to preserve the role and value of 
public transit within our current road infrastructure by supporting operational efficiency and social 
good. This is not to say transit itself will not change: it must change in order to survive. The solution 
proposed in this report preserves the social roles and values of transit, albeit with updates to 
current systems and methods to yield more and better service provision using the base of public 
revenues that the leaders of each region choose to invest in new, more effective approaches to 
public transportation.
A reliable and affordable supply of on-demand trips from the ride-hailing services of today can be 
used to fill gaps in existing public transit offerings, provide first-/last-mile access that complements 
rather than erodes ridership, and provide better reach and accessibility for mobility-disadvantaged 
populations. This expansion of public transit’s very meaning ahead of the arrival of robotaxis could 
precipitate a decline in automobile ownership that paves a way to reduced traffic congestion while 
door-to-door, on-demand mobility opportunities grow for all segments of society. 
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